Complementarity and mutual influence inform the interaction between international humanitarian law and international human rights law in most cases. In some cases when there is contradiction between the two bodies of law, the more specific norm takes precedence (lex specialis). The author analyses the question of in which situations either body of law is more specific. She also considers the procedural dimension of this interplay, in particular concerning the rules governing investigations into alleged violations, court access for alleged victims and reparations for wrongdoing.
international jurisprudence on the Palestinian territories, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Chechnya leaves no doubt as to the applicability of human rights to situations of armed conflict.
In short, these regimes overlap, but as they were not necessarily meant to do so originally, one must ask how they can be reconciled and harmonized. As M. Bothe writes,
[T]riggering events, opportunities and ideas are key factors in the development of international law. This fact accounts for the fragmentation of international law into a great number of issue-related treaty regimes established on particular occasions, addressing specific problems created by certain events. But as everything depends on everything, these regimes overlap. Then, it turns out that the rules are not necessarily consistent with each other, but that they can also reinforce each other. Thus, the question arises whether there is conflict and tension or synergy between various regimes. 4 How human rights and humanitarian law can apply coherently in situations of armed conflict is still a matter of discussion. Jurisprudence over the last few years has changed the picture considerably and, to a certain extent, the law is constantly evolving. Jurisprudence on concrete cases will, hopefully, provide more clarity over time. So far, some areas are becoming clearer and in other areas patterns are emerging but are not consolidated.
This article seeks to provide some parameters which can inform the interplay between human rights and humanitarian law in a given situation. Indeed, two main concepts should govern their interaction : complementarity and mutual influence of the respective norms in most cases, and in some cases precedence of the more specific norm (lex specialis) when there is contradiction between the two bodies of law. The question is: in which situations is either body of law the more specific?
Lastly, the procedural dimension will be considered, for that is possibly where the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law has its most practical effect: what are the rules governing investigations into alleged violations, court access for alleged victims and reparations for wrongdoing ?
The overlap of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict
The converging development of human rights law and humanitarian law
Beyond their common humanist ideal, international human rights law and international humanitarian law had little in common at their respective inception. The theoretical foundations and motivations of the two bodies of law differed.
The rationale for modern human rights is to find a just relationship between the state and its citizens, to curb the power of the state vis-à-vis the individual. 5 To begin with, human rights were a matter of constitutional law, an internal affair between the government and its citizens. International regulation would have been perceived as interference in the exclusive domain of the state. Except for the protection of minorities after the First World War, human rights remained a subject of national law until after the Second World War. They then became part of international law, starting with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
Humanitarian law, for its part, was based first and foremost on the reciprocal expectations of two parties at war and on notions of chivalrous and civilized behaviour. 6 It did not emanate from a struggle of rights claimants, but from a principle of charity -"inter arma caritas ". 7 The primary motivation was a principle of humanity, not a principle of rights, and its legal development was made possible by the idea of reciprocity between states in the treatment of one another's troops. 8 Considerations of military strategy and reciprocity have historically been central to its development. 9 Whereas human rights were an internal affair of states, international humanitarian law, by its very nature, took root in the relations between states, in international law (even if some of its precedents, such as the Lieber Code, were meant for civil war).
After the Second World War the protection of civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention, although largely destined only for those of the adversary or third parties, added a dimension to humanitarian law that brought it much closer to the idea of human rights law, especially with regard to civilians in detention. Here, humanitarian law started to apply to the traditional realm of human rights law, namely the relationship of the state to its citizens. The codification of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 likewise brought the two bodies of law closer, for it concerned the treatment of a state's own nationals. But although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, just one year before the codification of the Geneva Conventions, the drafting histories show that the elaboration of the Declaration and that of the Geneva Conventions were not mutually inspired. While general political statements referred to the common ideal of both bodies of law, there was no understanding that they would have overlapping areas of application. It was probably not assumed, at the time, that human rights would apply to situations of armed conflict, at least not to situations of international armed conflict. 10 Yet there are clear reminiscences of the newly ended war in the debates on the Universal Declaration. It is probably fair to say that "for each of the rights, [the delegates] went back to the experience of the war as the epistemic foundation of the particular right in question ". 11 Many of the worst abuses the delegates discussed took place in occupied territories. Even so, the Universal Declaration was meant for times of peace, since peace was what the United Nations sought to achieve.
As the four Geneva Conventions had been formulated at some speed in the late 1940s, there was still scope for development and improvement, especially for situations of non-international armed conflict. But the development of humanitarian law came to a standstill after the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in New Delhi in 1957. While the Conference adopted the "Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War " 12 drawn up by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the initiative was not pursued.
At the United Nations, on the other hand, states slowly started to emphasize the relevance of human rights in armed conflict. As early as 1953, the General Assembly invoked human rights in connection with the Korean conflict. Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms ". 14 The situation in the Middle East, especially, triggered the will to discuss human rights in situations of armed conflict. In 1967 the Security Council, with regard to the territories occupied by Israel after the Six Day War, clearly made known its consideration that "essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war". 15 A year later the Tehran International Conference on Human Rights marked a decisive step by which the United Nations accepted, in principle, the application of human rights in armed conflict. The first resolution of the International Conference, entitled "Respect and enforcement of human rights in the occupied territories", called on Israel to apply both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions in the occupied Palestinian territories. 16 Then followed the resolution entitled "Respect for human rights in armed conflict ", which stated that "even during the periods of armed conflicts, humanitarian principles must prevail". It was reaffirmed by General Assembly Resolution 2444 of 19 December 1968 with the same title, requesting the Secretary-General to draft a report on measures to be adopted for the protection of all individuals in times of armed conflict. His two reports concluded that human rights instruments, especially the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) -which had not even entered into force at that time -afforded a more comprehensive protection to persons in times of armed conflict than did the Geneva Conventions alone. 17 The Secretary-General even mentioned the state-reporting system under the Covenant -not yet in force -which he thought "may prove of value in regard to periods of armed conflict ", 18 thus already anticipating the later practice of the Human Rights Committee.
Pursuant to the two reports of the Secretary-General, the UN General Assembly affirmed in its resolution on "Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflict " that "[f]undamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict ". 19 It was around this period that one observer wrote, "the two bodies of law have met, are fusing together at some speed and … in a number of practical instances the regime of human rights is setting the general direction and objectives for the revision of the law of war". The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, which met from 1974 to 1977, was in part a reaction to the UN process. The ICRC in particular could now relaunch the process of developing international humanitarian law to improve the protection of civilians not only in international but also in non-international armed conflict. The Diplomatic Conference and its outcome, the two Additional Protocols of 1977, owed an undeniable debt to human rights -some rights which are derogable under human rights law were notably made non-derogable as humanitarian law guarantees. Both Additional Protocols acknowledge the application of human rights in armed conflict. 21 While the ICRC did not follow this course in the early stages of the discussion, 22 30 The Security Council has also addressed human rights violations by "militias and foreign armed groups" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 31 The applicability of human rights treaties to situations of armed conflict is also confirmed by the existence of derogation clauses allowing for, but also restricting, derogation from human rights in times of emergency, which either explicitly or implicitly include wartime situations. 32 Finally, some newer international treaties and instruments incorporate or draw from both human rights and international humanitarian law provisions. This is the case of the Convention on 
Developments in international jurisprudence
A further important development leading to the recognition that human rights law applies to situations of armed conflict is the vast body of jurisprudence by universal and regional human rights bodies.
The UN Human Rights Committee has applied the ICCPR to both noninternational and international armed conflict, including situations of occupation, in its concluding observations on country reports as well as its opinions on In the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Wall case) the Court expanded this argument to the general application of human rights in armed conflict :
More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law. 47 It confirmed this statement in the case concerning the territory in eastern Congo occupied by Uganda (DRC v. Uganda). In this judgment, it repeated the holding of the advisory opinion in the Wall case that international human rights law applies in respect to acts done by a state in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory and particularly in occupied territories. 48 It thereby made it clear that its previous advisory opinion with regard to the occupied Palestinian territories cannot be explained by the long-term presence of Israel 
Extraterritorial application of human rights
Like the International Court of Justice, human rights bodies have not only applied human rights to armed conflict situations within the territory of a country, but also to armed conflict situations abroad. The extraterritorial reach of human rights has, more recently, and in particular in connection with the armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, sparked some controversy. While the International Court of Justice, as explained above, affirms the application of human rights extraterritorially as a general principle, arguments about this question focus on the wording of the different treaties and must be dealt with separately.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR contains the most restrictive application clause of international human rights treaties, since its Article 2(1) confines the Covenant's application to the obligation of the state to respect and ensure human rights "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction ". The ordinary meaning of this clause implies that both criteria apply cumulatively. However, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted the clause to mean persons either within the jurisdiction or within the territory of the state, and understands persons "within the jurisdiction " to mean anyone "within the power or effective control of the state".
50
The origins of this jurisprudence lie in cases that have no link to armed conflict. They concern the abduction, outside the state party, of dissidents by agents of the secret service. One of the first cases relating to violations of the ICCPR by state agents on foreign territory is López Burgos v. Uruguay.
51 Kidnapped in Buenos Aires by Uruguayan forces, the applicant had been secretly detained in Argentina before being clandestinely transported to Uruguay. Had the Committee applied the Covenant according to the literal meaning of Article 2, it could not have held Uruguay responsible. Instead it used a teleological argument and took the view that "it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a state party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another state, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory".
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The long-standing jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee has confirmed this approach. In particular, the Committee has consistently applied the Covenant to situations of military occupation 53 and with regard to national troops States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party. … This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation. 55 On the basis of the requirement of power or effective control, the Human Rights Committee thus accepts the extraterritorial applicability of the Covenant in two types of situations: in the case of control over a territory, such as in the case of occupation, or over an individual, such as in the abduction cases.
The International Court of Justice has followed the Human Rights Committee's approach and furthermore relied on the travaux préparatoires of the Covenant:
The travaux préparatoires of the Covenant confirm the Committee's interpretation of Article 2 of that instrument. These show that, in adopting the wording chosen, the drafters of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory. They only intended to prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their state of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that state, but of that of the state of residence. 56 There is considerable controversy over the drafting history of the Covenant, especially between the Human Rights Committee and the United States, since the latter is of the opinion that the drafting history shows precisely that the Covenant was not meant to apply extraterritorially. 57 During the drafting, the United States proposed the addition of the requirement "within its territory" to Article 2, which only had the requirement "within its jurisdiction ". 58 Eleanor Roosevelt, the US representative and the then chair of the Commission, emphasized that the United States was "particularly anxious" not to assume "an obligation to ensure the rights recognized in it to citizens of countries under United States occupation ". 59 She explained that
The purpose of the proposed addition [is] to make it clear that the draft Covenant would apply only to persons within the territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting states. The United States [is] afraid that without such an addition the draft Covenant might be construed as obliging the contracting states to enact legislation concerning persons, who although outside its territory were technically within its jurisdiction for certain purposes. An illustration would be the occupied territories of Germany, Austria and Japan: persons within those countries were subject to the jurisdiction of the occupying states in certain respects, but were outside the scope of legislation of those states. Another illustration would be leased territories; some countries leased certain territories from others for limited purposes, and there might be question of conflicting authority between the lessor nation and the lessee nation.
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The United States took the view that the amendment was necessary "so as to make clear that a state was not bound to enact legislation in respect of its nationals outside its territory". 61 The United Kingdom followed the same line, and stated that "there were cases in which such nationals were for certain purposes under its jurisdiction, but the authorities of the foreign country concerned would intervene in the event of one of them committing an offence ". 62 However, with regard to troops maintained by a state in foreign areas Mrs Roosevelt stated that "such troops, although maintained abroad, remained under the jurisdiction of the State". 63 Considering these exchanges, it becomes clear that reliance on the travaux préparatoires is of little help. Indeed, while it is clear that the amendment "within its territory " was added to the text in order to constitute a cumulative requirement together with the jurisdiction requirement, the reasons for the amendment relate to very precise situations. The fear was of a conflict between the jurisdictions of sovereign states; there was no reason for one state to intervene on the territory of another if that other state had the means to uphold human rights. This is an altogether different scenario from the one envisaged in the López Burgos case or situations of occupation in which the authority of the occupied state has disappeared and been replaced by that of the occupying state.
The approach of the Human Rights Committee and the International Court of Justice can thus be justified in several ways. According to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose ". The Human Rights Committee appears to have adopted this approach in its recent observations, as it held that in good faith the Covenant must apply extraterritorially. 64 Furthermore, the "preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion" can be considered for purposes of interpretation not only if the meaning is ambiguous or obscure, but also if the interpretation according to the ordinary meaning "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable" (Article 32). In this sense, one member of the Human Rights Committee wrote in the López Burgos case, To construe the words "within its territory" pursuant to their strict literal meaning as excluding any responsibility for conduct occurring beyond the national boundaries would, however, lead to utterly absurd results. … Never was it envisaged, however, to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living abroad. 65 Thus, even relying on the travaux préparatoires, which at first glance indicate otherwise, the interpretations of the Human Rights Committee and the International Court of Justice are convincing and the Covenant must be understood to apply to persons abroad when they are under the effective control of a state party, at least when that control is exercised to the exclusion of control by the territorial state.
European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights rests on broader terms of application than the ICCPR in that, according to Article 1 ECHR, the states parties "shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction " the rights set forth in the Convention. 66 The drafting history of Article 1 thereof does not give much 64 " The State party should review its approach and interpret the Covenant in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context including subsequent practice, and in the light of its object and purpose ". Concluding Observations on the United States of America, United States of America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev1, 18 December 2006, para. 10. 65 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, above note 51. Individual opinion of Mr Tomuschat (emphasis added). Note that Tomuschat also excluded the situation of occupation from the scope of Article 2 -a conclusion that was not followed subsequently by the Human Rights Committee. 66 Article 1 ECHR.
indication as to the meaning of this article. The first draft made reference to "all persons residing within the territory " and was replaced by a reference to persons "within their jurisdiction ". The underlying consideration was that the word "residing " could be too restrictive and only encompass persons legally residing within the territory. It was consequently changed to "within their jurisdiction", based on Article 2 of the then Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights discussed by the UN Commission.
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The European Court of Human Rights has therefore more readily applied the Convention extraterritorially, as it merely had to interpret the meaning of the term "jurisdiction ". The Court found in the Loizidou case that where a state exercises effective overall control over a territory -a condition that is particularly fulfilled in the case of military occupation -it exercises jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. 68 It justified the effective control argument by saying that "any other finding would result in a regrettable vacuum in the system of human-rights protection in the territory in question by removing from individuals there the benefit of the Convention's fundamental safeguards and their right to call a High Contracting Party to account for violation of their rights in proceedings before the Court ".
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In the Banković case the European Court restricted its jurisprudence on extraterritorial application of the Convention. The case dealt with NATO's aerial bombardment of the Serbian Radio-Television station. The Court took the view that such bombardments did not mean that the attacking states had jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR; it stated that "[h]ad the drafters of the Convention wished to ensure jurisdiction as extensive as that advocated by the applicants, they could have adopted a text the same as or similar to the contemporaneous Articles 1 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 ". 70 The Court clearly saw a difference between warfare in an international armed conflict, where one state has no control over the other at the time of the battle, and the situation of occupation. It further argued that In short, the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating, subject to Article 56 of the Convention, in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States. The FRY clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. Accordingly, the desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights' protection has so far been relied on by the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention. 71 This argumentation leads to the understanding that the Court would not find that a state is exercising jurisdiction if it exercises overall control over a territory outside the Council of Europe. 72 However, subsequent judgments contradict this conclusion. In Ö calan v. Turkey the Court found Turkey responsible for the detention of the applicant by Turkish authorities in Kenya: it considered the applicant within the jurisdiction of Turkey by virtue of his being held by Turkish agents. 73 This broader extraterritorial application was confirmed in the case of Issa and others v. Turkey, in which the Court made it clear that control over an individual also engages the state's responsibility :
[A] State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State's authority and control through its agents operating -whether lawfully or unlawfully -in the latter State. Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.
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In both the Ö calan and the Issa case, the Court recognized that states have "jurisdiction " over persons who are in the territory of another state but who are in the hands of their own state's agents. Interestingly, in its justification the Court relied on the case law of the Human Rights Committee in the López Burgos case and of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. It held that "[a]ccountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory". 75 This argument was not confined to the "European legal space".
It is difficult to reconcile the Banković decision with later jurisprudence of the Court. One way of understanding Banković is that the Court simply did not find that the state had effective control either over the territory or the persons, so that no "jurisdiction " was given under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This does not, however, explain the argument about the European legal space. Another way of trying to find coherence in the jurisprudence is to follow the approach of the UK House of Lords in the Al-Skeini case. The House of Lords, after reviewing the case law of the European Court, 76 based its considerations on Banković as the authoritative case, excluding jurisdiction outside the area of the Council of Europe with the narrow exception of "activities of diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that state" 77 and military prisons. 78 That approach, on the other hand, disregards the argument of the Court in the Issa case or in even in the Ö calan case, where it was uncontroversial that Ö calan came within the jurisdiction of Turkey from the moment he was handed over to Turkish agents, without fulfilling any of the conditions set out in the interpretation of the House of Lords. Future jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will have to provide more clarity. An interesting case in this regard will be the decision in the interstate application from Georgia against Russia.
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In sum, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the meaning of "jurisdiction " in Article 1 is not entirely coherent. While it remains unclear to what extent the regional nature of the Convention will limit jurisdiction to territory within the geographical area of the Council of Europe in future cases, it appears that at least it will not take this limitation into account if people are in detention abroad. Another question that remains unclear is whether, if state agents committed an unlawful targeted killing abroad without controlling that area, this would mean that they exercised jurisdiction. The Issa case seems to indicate this, and it would indeed seem contradictory to hold a state accountable under the European Convention for killing a person in detention but not for a targeted shooting. But, again, the matter is not entirely settled.
It is submitted that the term "jurisdiction " in itself cannot support the contention that it means exercise of control abroad only when it is exercised in some states and not in others. A state may in practice, with or without the agreement of the host state, lawfully or unlawfully, exercise jurisdiction abroad. Thus "persons will come within the jurisdiction of a State in circumstances in which they can be said to be under the effective control of that State or are affected by those acting on behalf of the State more generally, wherever this occurs". 80 However, even if the Court in some cases cannot limit the application of the Convention because of lack of "jurisdiction ", it may decide to do so on the basis of a more general argument that the Convention is a regional and not a universal treaty.
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has long asserted jurisdiction over acts committed outside the territory of a state. 81 It has based this approach on the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which contains no application clause. The Commission's argument is teleological: since human rights are inherent to all human beings by virtue of their humanity, states have to guarantee those rights to any person under their jurisdiction, which the Commission understands to mean any person "subject to its authority and control ".
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The Commission also took rather a broader view with respect to military operations than the European Court of Human Rights. While the European Court rejected jurisdiction in Banković, the Inter-American Commission, effectively using a "cause and effect" test, stated in the case of the invasion of Panama by the United States in 1989 that
Where it is asserted that a use of military force has resulted in non-combatant deaths, personal injury, and property loss, the human rights of the noncombatants are implicated. In the context of the present case, the guarantees set forth in the American Declaration are implicated. This case sets forth allegations cognizable within the framework of the Declaration. Thus, the Commission is authorized to consider the subject matter of this case. 83 However, this case has been pending since 1993 and no decision has been reached on its merits.
The Inter-American Commission has also had to decide on killings of persons by state agents acting abroad. Thus it condemned as a violation of the right to life the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington and Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires by Chilean agents. 84 Similarly, it condemned attacks on Surinamese citizens by Surinamese state agents in the Netherlands.
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To sum up, the Inter-American Commission holds states accountable for any acts subject to their authority and control and has understood these criteria in the widest possible manner, including situations of armed attack on foreign territory. 81 For an overview of its jurisprudence see Cristina Cerna, " Extraterritorial application of the human rights instruments of the Inter-American system ", in Article 2 of the Convention against Torture requires each state party to take effective measures to prevent torture "in any territory under its jurisdiction ". The original proposal had only used the formulation "within its jurisdiction ". It was stated that this could be understood to cover citizens of one state who are resident within the territory of another state. It was proposed to change the phrase to "any territory under its jurisdiction", which would "cover torture inflicted aboard ships or aircraft registered in the State concerned as well as occupied territories ". 86 In line with this purpose, the Committee against Torture has understood this to include territories under the effective control of a state party to the Convention, but has done so against the protests of some states such as the United Kingdom 87 and the United States.
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not contain an application clause at all. 89 Both the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Court of Justice have nevertheless affirmed the applicability of this treaty to all persons within the control of a state, especially in occupied territory.
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 2(1)) guarantees the rights set forth in the Convention to each child within the jurisdiction of states party thereto; the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the International Court of Justice have understood this to include occupied territories. The positions and practice of states concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights, as expressed over a long period in General Assembly or Security Council resolutions, tend to confirm the application of human rights in international armed conflict. After the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops in 1956, the Security Council called upon the Soviet Union and the authorities of Hungary "to respect … the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms ". 95 In 1967 it considered, with regard to the territories occupied by Israel, that "essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war". 96 More recently, it has condemned human rights violations by "militias and foreign armed groups" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 97 As mentioned above, resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights have also sometimes invoked human rights in such situations. 98 Few states have contested, vis-à-vis the human rights bodies, the application of the human rights treaties abroad. 99 Apart from Israel, it is doubtful whether any state has consistently objected to the extraterritorial application of human rights instruments. Also, it should be noted that some important It would go beyond the scope of this article to analyse which human rights are customary. But it is uncontroversial that core human rights such as the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life, the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty or the right to a fair trial form part of customary international law. As for their territorial scope, it can be seen from the above-mentioned UN resolutions that extraterritorial application has not been called into question outside treaty law.
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Human rights in customary international law are of a universal nature and therefore belong to every human being, wherever he or she may be. It can hence be argued that customary human rights apply in all territories of the world and that any state agent, whether acting in his or her own territory or abroad, is bound to respect them. In other words, respect for customary human rights is not a matter of extraterritorial application, because outside of treaty application clauses, respect for human rights has never been territorially confined.
Complementarity and lex specialis
The concurrent application of human rights and humanitarian law has the potential to offer strong protection to the individual, but it can also raise many problems. With the increasing specialization of different branches of international law, different regimes overlap, complement or contradict each other. Human rights and humanitarian law are but one example of this phenomenon. 104 It is therefore necessary to review the pertinent international rules and general principles of interpretation in order to analyse the relationship between human rights and humanitarian law. 
Distinguishing features of human rights law and humanitarian law
Before the possibilities of concurrent application are discussed, some fundamental distinctions between the two bodies of law should be recalled. First, humanitarian law only applies in times of armed conflict, whereas human rights law applies at all times. Second, human rights law and humanitarian law are traditionally binding on different parties. While it is clear that humanitarian law is binding for "parties to the conflict " 105 -that is, both state authorities and non-state parties -this question is far more controversial in human rights law. Traditionally, international human rights law is understood to be binding only for states, and it will have to be seen how the law evolves in this regard. 106 Third, while most international human rights are with few exceptions derogable, 107 humanitarian law is non-derogable (with the sole limited exception of Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Lastly, there are considerable differences in procedural and secondary rights, such as the right to an individual remedy, as will be further discussed below.
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It is thus clear from the outset that a complete merging of the two bodies of law is impossible. It is natural, therefore, that the approach in jurisprudence and practice is rather that human rights and humanitarian law are not mutually exclusive, but complementary and mutually reinforcing. The concept of complementarity is, however, of a policy rather than a legal nature. To form a legal framework within which the interplay between human rights and humanitarian law can be applied, the principles of legal interpretation have to provide the tools. This leads to two main concepts: the concept of complementarity in its legal understanding in conformity with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the concept of lex specialis.
The meaning of "complementarity"
Complementarity means that human rights law and humanitarian law do not contradict each other but, being based on the same principles and values, can influence and reinforce each other mutually. In this sense, complementarity reflects a method of interpretation enshrined in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that, in interpreting a norm, "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties " shall be taken into account. This principle, in a sense, enshrines the idea of international law understood as a coherent system. 109 It sees international law as a regime in which different sets of rules cohabit in harmony. Thus human rights can be interpreted in the light of international humanitarian law and vice versa.
The meaning of the principle of lex specialis
Frequently, however, the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law is described as a relationship between general and specialized law, in which humanitarian law is the lex specialis. This was the approach of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case cited above, in which the Court held that
the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.
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The Court repeated the reference to the lex specialis principle in the Wall case. 111 It did not do so in the DRC v. Uganda case. 112 Since the Court gave no explanation for the omission, it is not clear whether the omission was deliberate and shows a change in the approach of the Court.
Among international human rights bodies the Inter-American Commission has followed the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, citing the lex specialis principle, 113 but other human rights bodies have not. Neither the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights nor the European Court of Human Rights have yet made known their views on the subject. The Human Rights Committee has done so, but has avoided the use of the lex specialis formulation and instead found that "both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive ". 114 The principle of lex specialis is an accepted principle of interpretation in international law. It stems from a Roman principle of interpretation according to which, in situations especially regulated by a specific rule, this rule would displace the more general rule (lex specialis derogat legi generali). The lex specialis principle can be found in the writings of such early writers as Vattel 115 or Grotius. Grotius writes, What rules ought to be observed in such cases [i.e. where parts of a document are in conflict]? Among agreements which are equal … preference should be given to that which is most specific and closest to the subject in hand, for special provisions are ordinarily more effective than those that are general.
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In legal literature a number of commentators criticize the lack of clarity of the principle of lex specialis. First, it has been said that international law, as opposed to national law, has no clear hierarchy of norms and no centralized legislator, but a "variety of fora, many of which are disconnected and independent from each other, creating a system different from the more coherent domestic legal order".
117 Second, it is stressed that the principle of lex specialis was originally conceived for domestic law and is not readily applicable to the highly fragmented system of international law.
118 Third, critics point out that nothing indicates, particularly between human rights law and humanitarian law, which of two norms is the lex specialis or the lex generalis;
119 some, for instance, argue that human rights law might well be the prevailing body of law for persons in the power of an authority. 120 It has even been criticized that "this broad principle allows manipulation of the law in a manner that supports diametrically opposed arguments from supporters that are both for and against the compartmentalization of IHL and IHRL". 121 Critics have therefore proposed alternative models to the lex specialis approach, calling them a "pragmatic theory of harmonization ", 122 "cross-pollination ", 123 "cross-fertilization " 124 or a "mixed model". 125 Without going into detail, these approaches have in common an emphasis on harmony between the two bodies of law rather than tension.
Lastly, there appears to be a lack of consensus in legal literature about the meaning of the lex specialis principle. The Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law has found that lex specialis is not necessarily a rule to solve conflicts of norms; that it has, in 116 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Book II, section XXIX. Library Ires. 117 Anja Lindroos, " Addressing the norm conflicts in a fragmented system : the doctrine of lex specialis ", fact, two roles -either as a more specific interpretation of or as an exception to the general law. As Martti Koskenniemi explains, There are two ways in which law takes account of the relationship of a particular rule to a general rule (often termed a principle or a standard). A particular rule may be considered an application of the general rule in a given circumstance. That is to say, it may give instructions on what a general rule requires in the case at hand. Alternatively, a particular rule may be conceived as an exception to the general rule. In this case, the particular derogates from the general rule. The maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali is usually dealt with as a conflict rule. However, it need not be limited to conflict.
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Understood not as a principle to solve conflicts of norms but as a principle of more specific interpretation, the principle of lex specialis in itself incorporates the complementarity approach mentioned above. It comes very close to the principle of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which treaties must be interpreted in the light of each other.
There are thus two aspects to the lex specialis principle. One is its meaning as a principle of interpretation whereby a more general rule is interpreted in the light of a more specific rule. The other is its function as a rule governing conflicting norms.
In light of this understanding, the following conclusion can be drawn. While complementarity -that is, lex specialis in the sense of a rule of interpretation -can often provide solutions for harmonizing different norms, it has its limits. When there is a genuine conflict of norms, one of the norms must prevail.
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In such situations the lex specialis principle, in the sense of a conflict-solving rule, gives precedence to the rule that is most adapted and tailored to the specific situation. There may be controversy as to which norm is the more specialized in a concrete situation, and indeed "an abstract determination of an entire area of law as being more specific towards another area of law is not, in effect, realistic".
128 But this should not call the application of the principle of lex specialis as such into question. While the respective rules of humanitarian law and human rights law can mostly be interpreted in the light of one another, some of them are contradictory, and it has to be decided which one prevails. In determining which rule is the more specialized one, the most important indicators are the precision and clarity of a rule and its adaptation to the particular circumstances of the case.
The application of lex specialis in its two different functions to the interplay between human rights and humanitarian law can be illustrated by the example of the use of force, especially in non-international armed conflict and in situations of occupation. 
The use of force
Different standards for the use of force in human rights law and humanitarian law
The rules governing the use of force in humanitarian law and in human rights law are based on different assumptions. Human rights law "seeks review of every use of lethal force by agents of the state, while [humanitarian law] is based on the premise that force will be used and humans intentionally killed".
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In human rights law, lethal force can be used only if there is an imminent danger of serious violence that cannot be averted save for such use of force. The danger cannot be merely hypothetical, it must be imminent. 130 This extremely narrow use of lethal force to protect the right to life is confirmed in the Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which state that "intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life " and requires clear warning before the use of firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed. 131 Under human rights law, the planning of an operation with the purpose of killing is unlikely ever to be lawful. Police officers are trained in de-escalation techniques or in the use of weapons in a manner completely different from that of soldiers. The European Court of Human Rights, for instance, has developed extensive case law on the requirements for planning and controlling the use of force in order to avoid the use of lethal force.
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In international humanitarian law, the main principles reining in the use of force are the principles of distinction, of precaution and of proportionality in order to avoid incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects. 133 The principle of proportionality in humanitarian law is different from proportionality in human rights law. 134 Whereas human rights law requires that the use of force be proportionate to the aim to protect life, humanitarian law requires that the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects caused by an armed attack must not be excessive "in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated ". 135 The two principles can lead to different results. On the other hand, some authors argue that the "differences are fading progressively away and as HRL bodies develop an increasing branch of wartime human rights, sensitive to the peculiar characteristics of that type of situation ".
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There is a growing position that even under humanitarian law the ability to use lethal force is limited not only by a principle of proportionality protecting incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects, but also by other limitations inherent to humanitarian law, in particular the principle of military necessity and the principle of humanity. 137 One of the oldest norms cited in this respect is the preambular paragraph of the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which states that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish … is to weaken the military forces of the enemy ". 138 Other rules could be cited to support this approach, in particular the prohibition on refusing quarter 139 or on the use of weapons causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 140 In this sense, military necessity is understood not only as an underlying principle of international humanitarian law or even as an enabling principle subjecting other rules of humanitarian law to the military objective, but as a principle which imposes constraints on the means and methods of warfare. In terms of the use of force, it limits that use to the degree and kind of force necessary to achieve the enemy's submission. Hence, "the fact that [humanitarian law] does not prohibit direct attacks against combatants does not give rise to a legal entitlement to kill combatants at any time and any place so long as they are not hors de combat within the meaning of Article 41 [2] AP I". 141 However, this approach is not without controversy among scholars and practitioners of international humanitarian law.
In view of these distinct rules, it is interesting to look at recent developments in jurisprudence. Have they called the rules into question ? Have they led to a convergence, as is sometimes contended ? It must be borne in mind, however, that most of the existing jurisprudence is of human rights bodies and courts and, to 135 some extent, national courts. The judgments of these bodies and courts have no universally binding effect. Also, they adjudicate cases within the framework of specific treaties or laws. In particular, human rights bodies can often simply ignore humanitarian law because states have not acknowledged that they are involved in an armed conflict. An attempt must therefore be made to discover in which respect their statements can or cannot be generalized and whether or how they influence the broader, dogmatic discussion on human rights and humanitarian law.
Non-international armed conflict
While it would be fairly uncontroversial to assume that for the conduct of hostilities -that is, put simply, battlefield situations -humanitarian law is generally the lex specialis in relation to human rights law, two situations are more problematic : the use of force in non-international armed conflict ; and the use of force in situations of occupation, where human rights have an important role to play. Is humanitarian law always the lex specialis in those situations?
Humanitarian law
The treaty-based humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict contains very few rules on the conduct of hostilities. The most important one is the protection of civilians against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities, enshrined in Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II. However, it is relatively uncontroversial that the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities -for example, distinction, proportionality, precaution -are part of customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts.
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The difficulty is that there is no combatant status in non-international armed conflict. This could lead to the conclusion that, apart from the government's armed forces, there are only civilians in such conflicts -meaning that members of armed groups could only be attacked when they are actually conducting hostilities, but not at any other time. From a military point of view, this is held to be unfeasible and not to reflect the reality of armed conflict. It moreover creates an imbalance between members of government armed forces, who could then be attacked at any time, and members of armed groups, who could not. During the drafting of Additional Protocol II there was no intention of precluding attacks at all times on members of armed groups who are fighting the government. On the contrary, the Commentary on 1977 Additional Protocol II states that "[t]hose belonging to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time". and fighters of armed opposition groups. So who can be attacked and under what conditions ?
There are, broadly speaking, three ways of approaching the targeting of members of armed groups in non-international armed conflict. The first is to hold that if a member of an armed group has a permanent fighting function, although he or she remains a civilian, 144 the mere fact of having the fighting function amounts to direct participation in hostilities and that person can therefore be attacked at all times (a sort of "continuous" direct participation in hostilities).
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The second approach is to define those members of armed groups which have a permanent fighting function as "combatants for the purposes of the conduct of hostilities ", but without conferring on them a combatant status and combatant immunity as in international armed conflict ("membership approach"). 146 The third approach is to consider that anyone who is not formally a combatant -that is, not a member of the armed forces -is a civilian and can only be attacked during the actual times when he/she is directly participating in hostilities.
The consequence of the first two approaches is that members of armed groups who have a fighting function could be attacked at all times under international humanitarian law. The rules restricting the use of force against them would be the rules regulating the means and methods of war, for example rules on the use of weapons, the prohibition of perfidy, or denial of quarter.
Both in doctrine and in jurisprudence, however, many feel uncomfortable with at least one part of this solution, for while it is unproblematic to accept that "rebels who are organized, armed and assembled cannot be arrested ", 147 it is far more controversial to maintain that a member of an armed group, even a member with a permanent fighting function, can at all times be targeted without 144 The Supreme Court of Israel has taken the approach that members of " terrorist " groups continue to be civilians that can be targeted if and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. the restrictions imposed by human rights law. Can a member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) be targeted when shopping in Bogotá, instead of the operation being so planned that he can be arrested ? Can a suspected member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) be targeted with lethal force in accordance with the principles of humanitarian law when taking part in a demonstration ? Can lethal force be used without any warning against a Chechen rebel in Moscow while he is at home? The main practical question is whether such persons have to be arrested, if that is a possibility, rather than killed. Should the traditional rules of humanitarian law prevail in such a situation, should they be influenced by human rights law, or should human rights law as lex specialis displace humanitarian law? Treaty-based international humanitarian law does not greatly clarify the question. As explained above, the principle of military necessity in its restrictive sense might stand in the way of shooting to kill a fighter in circumstances where there is no need to do so to achieve a concrete military aim, but this interpretation of military necessity remains, as yet, controversial.
148 On the other hand, such cases have increasingly been submitted to human rights bodies, which have addressed them from a human rights angle.
Human rights jurisprudence
One of the first cases was that of Guerrero v. Colombia, 149 which came before the UN Human Rights Committee. The authorities suspected that members of an armed opposition group had kidnapped a former ambassador and were holding him hostage in a house in Bogotá. While the hostage was not found, the police forces waited for the rebels to return and shot them. The UN Human Rights Committee held that
[T]he police action was apparently without warning to the victims and without giving them any opportunity to surrender to the police patrol or to offer any explanation of their presence or intentions. There is no evidence that the action of the police was necessary in their own defence or that of others, or that it was necessary to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of the persons concerned … the action of the police resulting in the death of Mrs. Maria Fanny Suarez de Guerrero was disproportionate to the requirements of law enforcement.
150
The Human Rights Committee has also criticized Israel's policy of targeted killings insofar as they are used, in part, as a deterrent or punishment, and has required that "before resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures to arrest a person suspected of being in the process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted ". 151 The Inter-American Commission has generally held that members of armed groups who assume combatant functions cannot "revert back to civilian status or otherwise alternate between combatant and civilian status ".
The most extensive case law is that of the European Court of Human Rights. Before relating it here, it should be noted that in none of the cases that have come before the Court have the respondent governments put forward the argument that an armed conflict prevailed in their country.
The European Court of Human Rights' seminal case on the use of force was McCann and others v. the United Kingdom, which concerned the killing of members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) by UK special forces in Gibraltar. In this case, the Court held that the use of force must not only be proportionate in the moment that it is exercised, but that operations, even against suspected terrorists, must be planned so as to minimize to the greatest extent possible recourse to lethal force. 152 This fundamental tenet lies at the heart of all subsequent cases on the use of force, be they law-inforcement or military operations. 153 In Güleç v. Turkey, in which police fired guns into a crowd to disperse demonstrators, the government argued that it had needed to use lethal force in a demonstration because of the suspected presence of PKK members. 154 The Court did not accept the argument and instead held that the authorities should have planned their operation so as to avoid lethal force, such as by using the necessary equipment such as truncheons, riot shields, water cannons, rubber bullets or tear gas, especially since the demonstration took place in a region in which a state of emergency had been declared and where at the time in question disorder could have been expected. 155 In Gül v. Turkey, the police fired at the door which Mehmet Gül was unlocking after they had knocked. The Court found the allegation by the police that Mehmet Gül had fired one pistol shot at them unsubstantiated. It held that opening fire with automatic weapons on an unseen target in a residential block inhabited by innocent civilians, including women and children, was grossly disproportionate. 156 In Ogur v. Turkey, the government asserted that the objective of the members of the security forces had been to apprehend the victim, who was thought to be a terrorist. On that occasion they had had to face a "major armed response", to which they had replied with warning shots, one of which had hit Musa Ogur, who had allegedly been running away. The Court did not accept that the security forces had come under attack and held that the use of force was disproportionate, since no warning had been given and the warning shot had been badly executed.
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In the case of Hamiyet Kaplan v. Turkey, the Court accepted that there was serious fighting between the government forces and the PKK. Four persons, including two children, died during a police raid on suspected members of the PKK, in the course of which a senior police officer was also killed by gunfire from the suspects' home. The Court accepted that there had been an armed confrontation between the police and the persons in the house and thus discarded the hypothesis that there had been an extrajudicial killing on the part of the police officers.
158 It nonetheless noted that during the organization of the operation, no distinction had been made between lethal and non-lethal force: the police officers had used only firearms, not tear gas or stun grenades. The uncontrolled violence of the assault on the house had inevitably put the suspects' lives in great danger. It criticized that there had been no sufficient legal framework and instruction to avoid the use of lethal force by the police officers and that therefore there had been a violation of the right to life. 159 Here again, although the Court did not contest the armed response of the suspect PKK members, it applied the strict requirements of law enforcement to the situation.
The common feature of these cases is that, even though the persons were alleged terrorists or suspected terrorists, the Court applies the full panoply of human rights safeguards for the right to life, including the necessity to avoid force, to use weapons which will avoid lethal injuries and to give warning.
In a number of recent cases, concerning security operations against Kurdish rebels in Turkey and Chechen rebels in Russia, the European Court of Human Rights has used language that is much closer to humanitarian law than to human rights law. In several cases since Ergi v. Turkey the Court, in assessing the proportionality of the use of force under Article 2 of the ECHR, has found that the state was responsible for "tak[ing] all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing group with a view to avoiding, and, in any event, minimising incidental loss to civilian life" 160 -a standard found textually not in human rights law but in the obligation in Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol I to take such precautions in attacks. The Court has accepted that injury to civilians might be a result of the use of force against members of organized armed groups, without qualifying that use of force as disproportionate. 161 As said above, this test differs somewhat from that in human rights law in that it neither requires that force may only be used as a last resort or Ergi the Court went very far in its requirement of precautionary measures, which included protection against firepower against civilians by PKK member caught in the ambush : Ergi, paras. 79, 80. 161 Ahmed Ö zkan and others v. Turkey, above note 43, para. 305 ; however, the Court found that the security forces should have verified after the combat operations whether any civilians were injured, para. 307.
that force must be avoided, to the extent possible, to spare not only innocent civilians but also the targeted person. In the Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva case, civilians were killed in a missile attack on a civilian convoy. While the Court made a general statement as to the need to avoid lethal force, 162 its test was, in effect, whether harm to civilians could be avoided "in the vicinity of what the military could have perceived as military targets ". 163 On the other hand, in Isayeva v. Russia, in which the applicant and her relatives were attacked by missiles when trying to leave a village through what they had perceived as safe exits from heavy fighting, the Court took a slightly different approach. While accepting the need for exceptional measures in the context of the Chechen conflict, 164 the Court nonetheless recalled that Russia had not declared a state of emergency or made a derogation within the terms of Article 15 of the ECHR, so that the situation had to be "judged against a normal legal background ". 165 It then held that
[e]ven when faced with a situation where, as the Government submit, the population of the village had been held hostage by a large group of wellequipped and well-trained fighters … the massive use of indiscriminate weapons … cannot be considered compatible with the standard of care prerequisite to an operation of this kind involving the use of lethal force by state agents. 166 It further held that the villagers should have been warned earlier of the attacks and should have been able to leave the village earlier. 167 Thus the Court used the human rights model based on a law enforcement situation, but then also took into account the insurgency and focused more on the indiscriminate nature of the weapons and the lack of warning and safe passage for the civilians. It did not question that the rebels could be attacked, even if they posed no immediate threat. 168 From its case law it can be concluded that the European Court of Human Rights -albeit never explicitly and not always entirely consistently -appears broadly to distinguish between two kinds of situations: on the one hand, situations like McCann, Gül, Ogur or Kaplan, in which individual members of armed groups or alleged members of such groups are killed and insufficient precautions are taken to avoid the use of lethal force altogether, including against those persons; on the other hand, situations like Ergi, Ö zkan or Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva and Isayeva, in which the government forces are engaged in military counterinsurgency operations or fully fledged combat against an armed group. In the latter cases the Court appears to use standards that are, if not explicitly then implicitly, inspired by humanitarian law, especially the criterion of whether incidental civilian loss was avoided to the greatest extent possible. It does not question the right of government forces to attack opposition forces, or require that lethal force be avoided even in the absence of an immediate threat. The Court does, however, appear to go a little further than traditional humanitarian law, in particular when it requires that the local population be warned of the probable arrival of rebels in their village, 169 or that the fire from the opposition group which could endanger the villagers' lives be taken into account. 170 Lastly, mention should be made of a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Israel. The Supreme Court had to decide on the targeted killing of members of armed groups -not in the context of a non-international armed conflict, but of occupation. Its findings are nonetheless instructive for our analysis, because the Supreme Court in effect combined the standards of humanitarian law and human rights law. While considering that "terrorists" were "civilians who are unlawful combatants " 171 and that at least those civilians who have joined a "terrorist organisation " and commit a chain of hostilities lose their immunity from attack for such time as they commit the chain of acts -that is, also between the single acts constituting the chain -it ruled as follows:
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[A] civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed. In our domestic law, that rule is called for by the principle of proportionality. Indeed, among the military means, one must choose the means whose harm to the human rights of the harmed person is smallest … Thus, if a terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated and tried, those are the means which should be employed … A rule-of-law state employs, to the extent possible, procedures of law and not procedures of force … Arrest, investigation and trial are not means which can always be used. At times the possibility does not exist whatsoever; at times it involves a risk so great to the lives of the soldiers that it is not required … However, it is a possibility which should always be considered. It might actually be particularly practical under the conditions of belligerent occupation, in which the army controls the area in which the operation takes place, and in which arrest, investigation and trial are at times realisable possibilities … Of course, given the circumstances of a certain case, that possibility might not exist. At times, its harm to nearby innocent civilians might be greater than that caused by refraining from it. In that state of affairs it should not be used … [A]fter an attack on a civilian suspected of taking an active part, at such time, in hostilities, a thorough investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack 169 upon him is to be performed (retroactively). That investigation must be independent …
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While the basis for its findings was national law, the Supreme Court quoted extensively from doctrine and from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In other words, the Supreme Court did take human rights into account, as its formulation ("the means whose harm to the human rights of the harmed person is smallest") shows. The Supreme Court required arrest wherever possible, and an investigation after the use of force. While it did not require an arrest in every situation, it required an investigation after every killing.
The possible interplay between humanitarian law and human rights law
What emerges from all the decisions discussed above (with the caveat that most of the decision are those of the European Court of Human Rights) is that presumed members of armed groups, "insurgents" or "terrorists" cannot be shot with intention to kill when there is a possibility of arresting them. This is typically the case when they are found in or around their homes 174 or far from any combat situation. 175 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights indicates that this is not the case when government forces are engaged in combat with armed groups.
As many emphasize, humanitarian and human rights law frequently lead to the same result. The outcome of most cases brought before human rights bodies would probably have been the same if decided by virtue of humanitarian law, for if the restrictive principles of military necessity and humanity are accepted, fighting members of armed groups not taking a direct part in hostilities must, if feasible in the actual circumstances, be arrested rather than killed.
However, unless an extremely expansive view is taken of the interpretation of humanitarian law in the light of human rights law, 176 the restrictions on the use of force do still appear to go further in human rights law than in humanitarian law. The first is that any operation including military operations in non-international armed conflict 177 involving the use of force must be planned in advance so as to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, the use of lethal force. Second, weapons must be chosen to avoid lethal force as far as possible. Third, any suspected violation of the right to life must entail an independent and impartial investigation ; the relatives of the person killed have a right to a remedy if they can reasonably claim that the right to life has been violated, and to individual reparation if such violation has occurred. In view of these differences, the question of which law applies to a particular use of force remains of practical importance. There are several ways of approaching the question of interplay.
With regard to the use of force in non-international armed conflict, the first would be to confine the application of humanitarian law to the geographical area where the fighting is taking place. Some arguments for this approach could possibly be found in the Tadić case:
Although the Geneva Conventions are silent as to the geographical scope of international "armed conflicts", the provisions suggest that at least some of the provisions of the Conventions apply to the entire territory of the Parties to the conflict, not just to the vicinity of actual hostilities. Certainly, some of the provisions are clearly bound up with the hostilities and the geographical scope of those provisions should be so limited. Others, particularly those relating to the protection of prisoners of war and civilians, are not so limited.
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This passage of Tadić could be understood to restrict certain rules of humanitarian law to combat situations, thereby giving way to human rights law in all other situations. However, subsequent jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has not confirmed this approach, in which some parts of humanitarian law would be applied to the entire conflict and not others. In the Kunarac case, the Appeals Chamber made it clear that the decisive criterion for the application of humanitarian law is whether there is an armed conflict and whether the act in question occurs in relation to the armed conflict.
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To explain the relationship between humanitarian law and the laws applicable in peacetime, the Chamber held that "[t]he laws of war do not necessarily displace the laws regulating a peacetime situation; the former may add elements requisite to the protection which needs to be afforded to victims in a wartime situation. " 180 Transposed to the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law, this means that while humanitarian law applies throughout the territory of the country in a situation of armed conflict, it is not the only relevant body of law, and human rights law may come to add requirements to be observed by the state authorities. This is a convincing approach : indeed, if there is a nexus to the conflict, for instance if the security forces are pursuing a member of an armed group, it would be contrary to the object and purpose of humanitarian law to discard it entirely. It would lead to a splitting of humanitarian law whereby some rules (e.g. on detention) always apply and others (on the conduct of hostilities) do not.
Retaining the undivided application of humanitarian law and human rights law to the entire territory, the better approach is therefore to apply the lex specialis rule. As regards the substantive right to life -that is whether a killing is lawful or not -the question of which body of law constitutes the lex specialis must be resolved by reference to their underlying object and purpose: human rights law is premised on the use of law-enforcement powers, whereas humanitarian law, in general, is centred on the battlefield (with the exception of occupation, which will be dealt with below). To apply human rights law is therefore only realistic if it is feasible to use the means of law enforcement, thus only in operations conducted by security forces (whether military or police) with some effective control over the situation. In those cases, human rights law constitutes the lex specialis. In combat situations, on the other hand, humanitarian law constitutes the lex specialis.
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For the conduct of hostilities, human rights law is generally flexible enough to accommodate the lex specialis of humanitarian law. This is where the statement of the International Court of Justice comes into play: "The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities". 182 The only exception to this would be in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which does not speak of "arbitrary deprivation of life" but, while containing much stricter requirements, is derogable under Article 15 of the ECHR "in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war". In the absence of derogations, the Court has nonetheless tacitly resorted to the rules of humanitarian law in situations which were characterized as battlefield situations, and indeed humanitarian law does constitute the lex specialis there.
Outside conduct of hostility situations, humanitarian law can usually either be interpreted in the light of 183 or be complemented by human rights law. Only where the two are incompatible will human rights law prevail.
What is effective control ? It will not be possible to answer this question in an entirely satisfactory manner, but guidance can be found in some useful criteria. The geographical criterion, although not the exclusive one, is the main one. Areas are characterized as being under greater or less control of the government forces. If the latter go out to apprehend a rebel in areas far away from the combat zone, they can do so by law-enforcement means. In other words, the closer the situation is to the battlefield, the more humanitarian law will prevail, and vice versa. Other relevant criteria can be, for instance, the amount of armed resistance met by the security forces, the duration of combats as opposed to isolated or sporadic acts, or the type of weaponry used. In practice, the lines will not always be easy to define. But a coherent interpretation of these existing bodies of law must attempt to provide a framework which gives some direction while at the same time remaining flexible in order to accommodate a large number of possible situations. One objection to applying human rights law to situations of conflict between the government and armed groups is that it restricts the government without restricting armed opposition groups. Indeed, human rights law traditionally only applies to state authorities. While this is controversial in doctrine, the fact remains that even if armed opposition groups were held to be bound by human rights, only actions by governments will be controlled by international human rights bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights. Is the state then "being required to fight with one hand tied behind its back"? 184 Arguably, no such imbalance between government forces and armed opposition groups is created by the additional restrictions of human rights law. This would be the case only if there were an equality of permissible use of force in place, which the additional requirement for the government would upset. But this is not the case, since any non-governmental group that attacks the government remains criminal under domestic law, and humanitarian law in non-international armed conflict does not shield members of the group from criminalization under domestic law as it shields combatants in international armed conflict. imposes a law enforcement obligation on the occupying authorities : public order is generally restored through police, not military, operations. 187 The particular feature of humanitarian law applicable to situations of occupation is that it presupposes effective authority and control, 188 which are not usually found on the battlefield. The 1907 Hague Regulations also clearly separate the sections on "Hostilities " (Section II) and on "Military authority over the territory of the hostile state" (Section III). In the same spirit, the Fourth Geneva Convention clearly indicates that the normal procedure to ensure public order and safety is through penal legislation, not through combat. 189 Which situations, then, require the occupying power to respect human rights law because it is performing its law-enforcement obligations, and in which situations do ongoing hostilities call for the use of force under humanitarian law? In abstract legal terms, the answer must be the same as proposed above: where the occupying power has effective control, is in a law-enforcement situation and capable of making arrests, it should act in compliance with the requirements of human rights law.
190
The concrete question facing the occupying power will be whether members of the enemy forces or of organized resistance movements can be targeted to be killed (in accordance with the rules governing the conduct of hostilities in international armed conflict) or whether the occupying power's forces must arrest them because they have sufficient effective control over the situation to do so.
In practice it is therefore necessary to differentiate between various situations of occupation, for while the very definition of "occupation " in humanitarian law presupposes control, there are in reality situations of occupation where control of the territory is only partial. Where hostilities continue or break out anew, humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities must prevail over human rights law, which presupposes control for its enforcement. The question is, of course, when can hostilities be said to have broken out anew? Not all criminal activity, even if violent, can be treated like an armed attack. What about military resistance by groups that are not formal members of the occupied state's armed forces? As was suggested at a meeting on the right to life in armed conflict, held by the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law in Geneva in 2005, 191 the test for assuming a situation of hostilities could be based on the test used by the ICTY to establish the existence of a non-international armed conflict -that is, a certain minimum intensity and duration of the violence. 192 Such situations would require a military response, whereas isolated or sporadic attacks 193 by resistance movements could be met by law-enforcement means.
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The Al-Skeini case, although it was not decided in this particular respect, illustrates how complicated the choice between the application of human rights or humanitarian law can become in a situation of occupation -or rather how difficult it is to apply the theory in practice. One of the questions was whether the killing of five persons in security operations by British troops during the occupation of the city of Basra in Iraq in 2003 was lawful under the European Convention on Human Rights. It was undisputed that while there was occupation by British troops in the Al Basra and Maysan provinces of Iraq at the time in question, 195 the United Kingdom possessed no executive, legislative or judicial authority in Basra city. It was there to maintain order in a situation verging on anarchy. The majority in the Court of Appeals found that there was no effective control for the purpose of application of the European Convention on Human Rights. 196 The decision shows that there can be two approaches to the application of human rights in situations of occupation. The majority found that there was not enough effective control even to apply the European Convention on Human Rights extraterritorially. Another way of arriving at the same result would be to hold that even though human rights law applies, the question of whether there is a violation of the right to life must be assessed by resort to the rules of international humanitarian law, which prevail as the lex specialis.
It is clear that this problem and shift in applicable rules on the use of force is not only of critical importance for the protection of civilians on the ground, but also has major impacts on the soldiers. To avoid violations, soldiers must be given clear rules of engagement and trained accordingly. In practice, this can best be achieved by separating police and military functions. 197 Even then, the distinction between a common criminal and a combatant will sometimes be extremely difficult to make, as has been acknowledged, for instance, in an After Action Report of American forces in Iraq. 
Investigations, remedies, reparation
Human rights law and humanitarian law differ fundamentally in a number of procedural aspects which have to do with the right to a remedy and to individual standing in human rights law. They also differ, originally, in terms of an individual right to reparation. While humanitarian law does not know such individual standing at international level, the main human rights treaties have a form of individual complaint mechanism that has led to case law on the right to a remedy, the right to an investigation and the right to reparation. Such case law has already started to influence the understanding of humanitarian law and could continue to do so in the future.
Investigations
Humanitarian law has a number of requirements for investigations, primarily for war crimes 199 but also, for instance, for deaths of prisoners of war 200 or civilian internees. 201 Investigatory obligations have also been developed in treaty law, soft law and jurisprudence in human rights law and are now rather more detailed than in international humanitarian law. 202 In human rights law, allegations of serious human rights violations, especially allegations of ill-treatment or unlawful killing, must be subject to a prompt, impartial, thorough and independent official investigation. The persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation must be independent from those implicated in the events. The investigation must be capable of leading to a determination not only of the facts, but also of the lawfulness of the acts and the persons responsible. The authorities must have taken reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings. In order to ensure public confidence in the investigation, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of it. While the degree of public scrutiny may vary from case to case, the victim's relatives must in all cases be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests, and must be protected from any form of intimidation. The result of the investigation must be made public. The European Court has even gone so far as to establish a presumption of responsibility of the state where individuals are killed in an area within the exclusive control of the authorities, 203 since the events lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities. 204 Human rights bodies have not hesitated to apply these requirements to investigations in situations of armed conflict. 205 Recently, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions lamented the fact that investigations are less frequent and often more lenient in armed conflict situations than in times of peace. 206 In this area there is scope for human rights to complement humanitarian law, especially with regard to the use of force or allegations of ill-treatment. Indeed, it is important to distinguish between the substantive law justifying the use of force, which differs in human rights law from that in humanitarian law, and the question of investigation, which in the first place requires a gathering of facts. In the latter respect, there is no contradiction between human rights and humanitarian law. Humanitarian law does not provide for a duty to investigate in such detail, but there is no reason to understand this as a qualified silence in the sense that it would preclude application of the duty under human rights law.
Evidently, it would not be realistic to require an investigation after every single use of force in a combat operation. 207 But there is a middle way between reviewing every single shot in an armed conflict and not reviewing any alleged violation at all of the right to life. The reality, in particular of counter-insurgency contexts, is that often the facts are not clear. If there are no investigations, security personnel can all too easily allege that they were acting on the assumption that lethal force was necessary because they were facing imminent attack 208 or that the rebels died in crossfire. 209 In many such circumstances the only way to achieve a result is through an independent investigation in which not only the security personnel can be heard but also witnesses supporting the victims' or their families' view.
There are elements in human rights jurisprudence that are certainly new to situations of armed conflict. Not all requirements of an investigation in peacetime may be directly transposable to situations of armed conflict. Also, investigations can only be conducted if practicable in the prevailing security situation and will have to take the reality of armed conflict into account, 210 such as problems in gathering evidence in some combat situations, lack of access for the investigating personnel, or the witnesses' need for security. On the other hand, it cannot be said that investigations are per se impossible to conduct in times of armed conflict. 211 In circumstances giving rise to concern as to the legality of the act, especially in cases of targeted killing of individuals, an investigation should at least be conducted when there is reasonable doubt whether the killing was lawful. 212 While the procedures for investigations in situations of armed conflict will have to be developed further, it is clear that they must comply with the requirements of independence and impartiality. In this respect, military investigations have been found to pose particular challenges in terms of independence. 213 Military investigations would have to be particularly analysed to assess their independence and impartiality and the role they allow for victims and their families.
Court scrutiny
Whereas humanitarian law focuses on "the parties to a conflict ", human rights are entirely built around the individual and are formulated as individual entitlements. 214 This does not imply that there are no rights in humanitarian law. On the contrary, the Geneva Conventions were deliberately formulated to enshrine personal and intangible rights. 215 But at the international level, human rights law, at least for civil and political rights, 216 recognizes a right to a remedy -that is, a right to lodge an individual complaint against alleged violations. 217 Such a right does not exist in humanitarian law. 218 Most of the case law involving the interplay between human rights and humanitarian law has been decided on the basis of human rights law, because victims could only bring cases to human rights bodies. This is why, seemingly, one of the most dramatic effects of the application of human rights law to situations of armed conflict is that it leads to court scrutiny. Never before have situations of international armed conflict or of military operations abroad been scrutinized as much as in the cases concerning Kosovo, Iraq or Afghanistan. It is sometimes contended that such court scrutiny is inappropriate for military action, but is this really the case ? 219 The necessity to have not only an international criminal court, but also a better supervisory mechanism for humanitarian law or even "a body or tribunal whose function it would be to receive complaints against Governments that flout the provisions of the [Hague and Geneva] Conventions ", 220 has been discussed for many decades. 221 At international level such a court or tribunal has never met with the approval of states. Could there be a reason, then, for restricting access to courts, at least at national level? Is it that humanitarian law is not justiciable because of the exceptional nature of military action? Practice shows that this argument does not hold sway, for there is a long history of interpretation of humanitarian law in courts.
Indeed, international courts such as the International Court of Justice, international and hybrid criminal tribunals, and national courts have interpreted international humanitarian law. As indeed have national courts, be they in Israel, Colombia or elsewhere, often with human rights or domestic fundamental rights as the basis for the victim's complaint and standing. The Supreme Court of Israel has often had to address the question of justiciability and has stated in this respect :
The Court does not refrain from judicial review merely because the military commander acts outside of Israel, or because his actions have political and military ramifications. When the decisions or acts of the military commander impinge upon human rights, they are justiciable. The door of the Court is open. The argument that the impingement upon human rights is due to security considerations does not rule out judicial review. "Security considerations " or "military necessity" are not magic words … 222 Thus there is no reason why actions in armed conflict should not be justiciable. But in the absence of other avenues, most cases have come before criminal courts or human rights bodies.
Clearly courts must take into account the specific nature of war. They have, in practice, referred the discretion of the military commander or the soldier in the midst of an operation. One example of court supervision which leaves discretion to the military commander, taking into account his or her position and point of view, is provided by the cases of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg :
We are not called upon to determine whether urgent military necessity for the devastation and destruction of Finmark actually existed. We are concerned with the question whether the defendant at the time of its occurrence acted within the limits of honest judgment on the basis of the conditions prevailing at the time … It is our considered opinion that the conditions as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient, upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made. This being true, the defendant may have erred in the exercise of his judgment, but he was guilty of no criminal act. 223 It is sometimes criticized that human rights bodies and courts do not have the required expertise to deal with armed conflict situations. 224 But from the point of view of victims of violations it is difficult to argue that, in the absence of any independent international remedy specifically foreseen for international humanitarian law, recourse to the regional human rights courts and other human rights bodies is not a valid path. Rather, "[t]he fact that an individual has a remedy under human rights law gives additional strength to the rules of international humanitarian law corresponding to the human rights norm alleged to be violated ". 225 Such independent scrutiny can provide greater protection for the victims or reinforce the protection by other mechanisms and institutions. 226 Another criticism is that persons protected by humanitarian law are usually not in a position to resort to any legal process, and that it is better to have an impartial body which acts on its own initiative rather than judicial mechanisms. 227 It is true that people will often not have access to any judicial protection. The plethora of existing cases, however, is proof in itself that the argument is too short-sighted. It proposes a choice between either a judicial protection mechanism or legal protection, but these are not exclusive alternatives. There are many ways to provide protection to persons in armed conflict, be it through the activities of humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, political mechanisms such as certain UN fora, legal proceedings, pressure exerted through advocacy groups or decisions by international criminal bodies. 228 Court scrutiny, including through human rights courts or domestic courts giving standing to victims of fundamental rights violations can be a forceful method of protection.
In fact human rights law is not necessarily more protective in terms of substantive rights. 229 One only has to bear in mind two critical restrictions on human rights law: its dependence on some jurisdiction or effective control by the state; and the fact that it is not binding on non-state parties. 230 Also, if human rights bodies completely disregard humanitarian law, especially in a situation where it is the lex specialis, or distort human rights by implicitly but not openly employing humanitarian law language, this could lead to a weakening of both bodies of law. It also "precludes a coherent construction of the protective rules in times of armed conflict while favouring fragmentation ". 231 Clarity as to which norms are being applied to a certain situation would be a preferable manner of protecting victims of armed conflict in the long term. While most international human rights bodies have not applied international humanitarian law directly, as their mandate only encompassed the respective applicable human rights treaties 232 , the Inter-American Court has applied humanitarian law by interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights in the light of the Geneva Conventions because of their overlapping content. 233 The Inter-American Commission is the only body that has expressly assigned to itself the competence to apply humanitarian law. 234 In sum, there is no conflict between human rights law and humanitarian law in respect of legal remedies. Humanitarian law is simply silent on the question of an individual right to a remedy; it does not preclude individual remedies where they exist under other international law or domestic law. Human rights law has reinforced the possibility of alleged victims of violations of human rights and humanitarian law bringing cases before courts and other human rights bodies. This is not in conflict with humanitarian law, but can indeed strengthen compliance with it, albeit through the lens of human rights law.
Reparations
While human rights violations entail an individual right to reparation, 235 the equivalent norms on reparation in the law of international armed conflict only recognise this right, or at least the right to claim it, to the state. 236 The humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict is silent on reparation.
Nothing in international humanitarian law, however, precludes the right to reparation. 237 Many serious violations of humanitarian law simultaneously constitute serious violations of human rights. For the same act -for example, torture -a person can have a right to full reparation because it constitutes a human rights violation, even if no such right exists under humanitarian law. There is an increasing tendency to recognize that states should afford full reparation for violations of humanitarian law as well. The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly in 2005, 238 are a step in this direction. Similarly, in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the International Court of Justice held that Israel was under an obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all natural or legal persons affected by the wall's construction. 239 Also, there is some practice of reparation mechanisms, such as the UN Claims Commission or the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in which individuals can file claims directly, participate to varying degrees in the claims review process and receive compensation directly. 240 There is furthermore a wealth of practice in national law concerning reparation after armed conflict. 241 Article 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court marks an important development in that it recognizes the right of victims of international crimes to reparation (but with a margin of discretion for the Court).
Without going into the details of this complex discussion, the main argument against an individual right to reparation is that in times of armed conflict violations can be so massive and widespread and the damage done so overwhelming that it defies the capacity of states, both financial and logistical, to ensure adequate reparation to all victims. 242 From the point of view of justice this argument is flawed, because its consequence is that the more widespread and massive the violation, the less right there is to reparation for the victims. On the other hand, admitting an individual claim to reparation for victims of violations of humanitarian law committed on a large scale does bring with it real problems of implementation and the risk of false promises to victims. It will be interesting to follow the case law of the International Criminal Court in this regard, which can rely on an explicit provision on reparation in the Rome Statute (Article 75) and is currently developing an approach to victims' rights. It will probably have to take some more lump-sum-type compensation measures or community-based reparation measures to reach the widest possible number of victims. In any event, it is clear that while the simple statement that there is no individual right to reparation for violations of international humanitarian law is no longer adequate in the light of evolving law and practice, there remain many uncertainties as to the way in which widespread reparations resulting from armed conflict can be adequately ensured.
Conclusion
To sum up, the nature of international humanitarian law, which is not conceived around individual rights, makes it difficult to imagine that it could incorporate all procedural rights that have developed in human rights law. However, increasing awareness of the application of human rights in armed conflict, and also an increasing call for transparency and accountability in military operations, can promote stronger protection of certain rights under international humanitarian law.
How these two bodies of law, which were not originally meant to come into such close contact, will live in harmony in the broader framework of international law remains to be seen over time. But one thing is clear: there is no going back to a complete separation of the two realms. Potentially, a coherent approach to the interpretation of human rights and humanitarian law -maintaining their distinct features -can only contribute to greater protection of individuals in armed conflict.
